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Although beneficial allocational effects have been a central motivator for the 
Basel II capital adequacy reform, the interaction of these effects with Basel II’s 
procyclical impact has been less discussed. In this paper, we investigate the effect 
of capital requirements on the allocation of credit and its interaction with 
procyclicality, and compare Basel I and Basel II type capital requirements. We 
consider competitive credit markets where entrepreneurs of varying ability can 
apply for loans for one-period investment projects of two different risk types. The 
risk of a project further depends on the state of the economy, modelled as a two-
state Markov process. In this type of setting, excessive risk taking typically arises 
because higher-type borrowers cross-subsidize lower-type borrowers via a pricing 
regime based on average success rates. We find that risk-based capital 
requirements (such as Basel II) alleviate the cross-subsidization effect and can be 
chosen so as to implement first-best allocation. This implies that the ensuing 
reduction in the proportion of high-risk investments may mitigate the procyclical 
effect of Basel II on economic activity. Moreover, we find that optimal risk-based 
capital requirements should be set lower in recessions than in normal times. Our 
simulations show that when measured by either cumulative output or output 
variation, Basel II type capital requirements may actual be slightly less procyclical 
than flat capital requirements. The biggest reduction in procyclicality is however 
achieved with optimal risk-based capital requirements which are considerably 
higher than Basel II requirements and which are adjusted downwards in recession 
periods. 
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Luottojen kohdentuminen, vakavaraisuusvaatimukset 
ja suhdannevaihtelut 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 23/2009 
Esa Jokivuolle – Ilkka Kiema – Timo Vesala 




Pankkien vakavaraisuussääntelyn uudistuksessa (Basel II) on keskeisenä tavoit-
teena se, että sääntely tehostaisi pankkiluottojen kohdentumista. Toisaalta uusien 
vakavaraisuusvaatimusten pelätään vahvistavan suhdanteita. Näiden asioiden 
yhteisvaikutuksesta ei ole kuitenkaan juuri keskusteltu. Tässä tutkimuksessa 
tarkastellaan Basel II:n vaikutusta luottojen optimaaliseen kohdentumiseen. 
Kilpailullisessa luottomarkkinamallissa yrittäjät voivat hakea luottoa projekteille, 
joilla on erilainen riski ja joiden riski riippuu lisäksi suhdannetilasta. Tämä johtaa 
liian suuriin riskipitoisiin investointeihin, koska luotonottajista vähäisen riskin 
ottavat kompensoivat suuren riskin ottavia sellaisen hintamekanismin kautta, joka 
perustuu todennäköisyyteen, miten yrittäjät onnistuvat keskimäärin. Tulokseksi 
saadaan, että Basel II:n kaltainen riskiperusteinen vakavaraisuusvaatimus 
lieven¬tää ristisubventiota ja tehostaa siten luottojen kohdentumista. Tästä seuraa, 
että Basel II  sääntely ei välttämättä voimista suhdanteita, koska riskipitoisimpien 
investointien suhteellisen osuuden pieneneminen voi vähentää pankkien luoton-
annon suhdanneherkkyyttä. Simulointitulokset osoittavatkin, että Basel II -tyyppi-
sessä vakavaraisuussääntelyssä suhdannevaihtelu on jonkin verran vähäisempää 
kuin kiinteiden vakavaraisuusvaatimusten järjestelmässä, kun asiaa mitataan joko 
kumulatiivisen kokonaistuotannon tai kokonaistuotannon vaihteluiden avulla. 
Kaikkein vähäisin suhdannevaihtelu saavutetaan optimaalisilla riskiperusteisilla 
vakavaraisuusvaatimuksilla, jotka ovat Basel II -vaatimuksia tiukemmat ja joita 
lievennetään suhdannetaantumassa. 
 
Avainsanat: Basel II, pankkien sääntely, vakavaraisuusvaatimukset, luottoriski, 
myötäsyklisyys 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D41, D82, G14, G21, G28  
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Minimum capital requirements on banks are a central element of the regulatory
construction which aims at containing systemic risk in the banking sector.
Capital requirements are commonly seen as a complement to deposit insurance
in preventing bank runs. They can curb banks’ risk taking incentives and aim
at enforcing a minimum level of solvency for banks (Pennacchi, 2005, provides
a recent discussion on the role of capital requirements). To be successful
in achieving these aims capital requirements should be proportioned with
the actual risks banks take.1 This is what the new set of minimum capital
requirements, known as Basel II, tries to achieve. In the new framework
the amount of capital a bank is required to hold at the minimum against
a given credit asset depends on the credit risk of that asset.2 This contrasts
sharply with the previous regulatory framework, Basel I, refering to the Basel
Capital Accord of 1988, under which banks faced a ﬂat 8% minimum capital
requirement against any asset in their corporate loan portfolio.
‘Flat-rate’ capital requirements pose an obvious problem. As the cost
of holding capital is incorporated into loan prices, the ﬂat-rate requirement
eﬀectively means that low risk customers cross-subsidize high risk borrowers.3
This increases the attractiveness of high risk loans and thus raises the
average credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio. An advantage of risk-based
capital requirements is that they can alleviate these potential allocational
distortions across diﬀerent loan risk categories. The Basel Committee (2001)
has itself used a similar motivation for the reform. At the same time,
however, it has been argued that a potentially serious drawback of risk-based
capital requirements is that they may exacerbate ‘procyclicality’ of capital
requirements. In an economic downturn, credit losses typically erode banks’
capital base and default probabilities of the surviving customers increase,
which implies that banks’ risk-based capital requirements also increase. Since
raising new capital during hard times may be diﬃcult or very costly, banks
may be forced to scale back their lending activity, thereby exacerbating the
1The importance of this prerequisite is highlighted eg by the following quote from The
Economist (2007), commenting on the subprime crisis which started in the latter half of
2007: ‘...the banks now facing up to these contingent liabilities (via conduits or implicit
reputational concerns) have not had to set aside capital in case of trouble — that gap in
regulations was precisely what made it so attractive to get their investments oﬀ balance
sheets in the ﬁrst place’.
2The main techical innovation in Basel II to implement risk-based minimum capital
requirements is called the internal-ratings-based (IRB) approach. More precisely, a bank is
required to use a scale of internal ratings in which each credit customer is categorized. The
bank further estimates the average probability of default in each rating category. This along
with other credit risk parameters determines the minimum capital requirement based on a
mathematical formula provided in the Basel II framework (for details see Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2006). The IRB approach is applicable also in credit asset categories
other than corporate credits although in this paper we focus on the corporate credit assets.
Throughout this paper it is implicitly assumed that there is no moral hazard in banks’
determining the internal ratings and hence their own capital requirement. The consequences
of relaxing this assumption are studied in Blum (2007).
3The discussion on why capital requirements impose an additional cost on banks is
deferred to section 3.
7recession (see eg Kashyap and Stein, 2004, Gordy and Howells, 2006, and
Pennacchi, 2005).
Although the beneﬁcial allocational eﬀects of risk-based capital
requirements have been a central motivation for the Basel II reform, their
potential interaction with Basel II’s alleged procyclical impact has been less
discussed. Namely, intensity of procyclicality could depend on the risk-proﬁle
of banks’ loan portfolios. If the relative share of risky assets is high, then
the need to collect fresh capital after a negative macroeconomic shock may be
signiﬁcant due to large credit losses and the substantial increase in the default
probabilities and hence capital requirements of the remaining borrowers. Since
risk-based capital requirements unravel the cross-subsidization mechanism
related to the ﬂat-rate regime, the new requirements could induce a general
shift towards less risky portfolios. As a result, there would be less defaults and
more moderate increase in capital requirements during a recession. Hence,
the portfolio shift could constitute an attenuating eﬀect on procyclicality of
the new regime.4 Moreover, this counterbalancing eﬀect may be coupled
with a more eﬃcient allocation of credit obtained with risk-based capital
requirements.
In this paper we analyse the eﬃciency of resource allocation in the credit
market under ﬂat-rate and risk-based capital requirements. In order to focus
on the allocational eﬀects of capital requirements and their interplay with
procyclicality, we have adopted a simpliﬁed model of banking. In particular,
we do not explicitly consider the possibility of bank failures in our model and
therefore capital requirements do not have an explicit role in banks’ solvency.
Capital requirements in our model are rather a tax-like instrument which
have an eﬀect on banks’ cost of capital and hence pricing and allocation of
credit. The model economy can be in one of two Markov states in each
period, normal or recession, which evolve according to exogenously given
transition probabilities. An adverse selection type of setup and the dynamic
structure of the model enables us to analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects of capital
requirements on economic activity and thus compare the procyclicality of
the ﬂat-rate and risk-based capital requirements. We construct a model
where long-lived ‘entrepreneurs’ can in each period choose between investment
projects of diﬀerent risk characteristics, which last for one period, or they can
d e c i d en o tt ot a k eu pap r o j e c ta ta l l . T h em a c r os t a t ei su n k n o w nw h e n
investment and labor decisions are made. More speciﬁcally, we consider two
uncertain investment opportunities, a ‘high-risk’ and a ‘low-risk’ investment,
as well as an outside option (call it labor market) that produces a ﬁxed
payoﬀ with certainty. Following De Meza and Webb (1987) and Vesala (2007),
entrepreneurs’ intrinsic and unobservable ‘types’ determine their success rates
in the investment projects. High-risk projects are more sensitive to the
entrepreneurial type than low-risk investments while the payoﬀ in the labor
market is independent of the intrinsic type. The success probabilities of the
projects also depend on the macro state of the economy: in a recesssion, the
success probabilities decline, and the success probability of a high-risk project
4Also the Basel Committee (2001) has pointed out that ‘(Basel I) which does not
adequately reﬂect changes in risk creates incentives for banks to make high-risk investments
that may contribute to cyclicality over the business cycle’.
8declines more than the success probability of a low-risk project. If a project
fails, the entrepreneur can start again with a new project, or choose the outside
option, in the next period. However, aggregate economic activity in each period
will be reduced by the lost output of the failed projects.
Let us consider the credit allocation problem of the economy in any single
period. Eﬃcient resource allocation is obtained when entrepreneurs with the
highest types invest in high-risk projects which also oﬀer the best payoﬀ
when successful. Entrepreneurs at the bottom end of the type distribution
do not invest at all but stick to the safe outside option. Types located in
the middle should invest in low-risk projects. In equilibrium there are two
unique threshold entrepreneur types indicating the division of the investment
choices of the various types. Banks cannot observe the explicit success
rate of an individual entrepreneur but they rationally expect the equilibrium
average success probabilities within each investment class. Banks are assumed
to operate in competitive credit markets where loan prices for high-risk
and low-risk investments are determined by banks’ posterior beliefs about
average success rates within each investment category. The competitive
loan prices, in turn, govern entrepreneurs’ self-selection among diﬀerent
investment opportunities. The entrepreneurs in the model could perhaps
best be understood as representing the small and medium-size corporate loan
customers of banks. Such ﬁrms still typically rely on bank ﬁnance and,
therefore, we do not consider capital markets as an alternative source of
ﬁnance. It is also important to note that our model diﬀers from the models
of relationship lending in which banks possess private information of the
borrowers. However, we believe that our model of competitive banks with no
private information of their borrowers is quite relevant especially in the context
of lending booms when typically many new potential borrowers may seek bank
ﬁnancing. It is important to understand the eﬀects of capital requirements on
banks’ risk taking in lending booms which have often been critical times in
accumulating threats to banks’ long-term stability.
The conventional result in this kind of setting is that there is too much
risk-taking because higher-type borrowers cross-subsidize lower-type borrowers
through the price system that is based on average success rates (De Meza and
9Webb, 1987).5 We also observe that the ﬂat-rate capital requirements induce
at r a d e - o ﬀ between optimal composition of loans and the eﬃciency of overall
bank lending volume. By contrast, risk-based capital requirements alleviate
the cross-subsidization eﬀect in high-risk investments and thereby reduce
overinvestment in these projects. Moreover, the lower capital requirement
against low-risk loans increases entrepreneurs’ general participation in the
credit market, so that the overall lending volume is higher under the risk-based
capital requirements than under the ﬂat-rate regime. In actuality, we show
that there exists a risk-based capital requirement schedule that implements
both the ﬁrst-best loan composition and the ﬁrst-best lending volume. This
central result obtains because capital requirements which are diﬀerentiated
according to projects’ risks provide a suﬃcient number of instruments, unlike
a constant capital requirement, to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. In eﬀect,
the project-speciﬁc loan prices can be individually adjusted so that it is not
optimal for intermediate types to pool with the best types or for the worst
types to pool with intermediate types. Reminiscent of Repullo (2004), our
model also implies that the introduction of risk-based capital requirements
would allow for a reduction in the overall level of regulatory capital.6 It is also
worth noting that at one level our paper provides a mechanism, ie, risk-based
capital requirements, to unwind the over-investment equilibrium which is a
policy problem discussed already since the original work of De Meza and Webb
(1987).
Importantly, we also ﬁnd that the optimal risk-based capital requirements
should probably be decreased in a recesssion. There are two reasons to
this, the ﬁrst of which is apparently novel in the literature while the second
one has already been discussed earlier. Firstly, as the proﬁtability of all
projects declines in a recession, one may expect that the proﬁtability of the
high-risk projects declines even more than that of the low-risk projects. In
this case the allocational distortion inherent in the credit market becomes
5Our choice of the De Meza and Webb (1987) type of framework which produces
overinvestment in high-risk assets even in the absence of bank capital requirements is of
course a crucial starting point to our analysis. It is often argued that the alternative
framework based on Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) type of assumptions which produce credit
rationing may be empirically more relevant. Nonetheless, several arguments can be provided
to justify our starting point. First, there are papers that argue that risks in the banking
sector may build up during economic upturns (see Borio et al, 2001, and Rajan, 1994).
Several recent crisis episodes such as those in Japan, Scandinavia, Asia and, indeed, the
subprime crisis, appear to verify the possibility of such excessive investment in booms.
Overinvestment ﬁnanced by commercial banks has been a central issue also in the credit
market turmoil that started in the second half of 2007 from the US subprime mortgage
market. The second argument relates to the construction of prudential policies. Given
that periodic overinvestment is possible, even if not necessarily the prevailing condition in
credit markets, it seems more important from the ﬁnancial stability viewpoint to analyse and
design capital requirements that work well in curbing banks’ risk-taking under circumstances
of inherent overinvestment rather than underinvestment. Finally, as De Meza and Webb
(1987) have shown, debt is the optimal contract in their type of framework whereas in the
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) setting equity would be optimal. Therefore the overinvestment
framework may be more consistent with credit markets analysed in this paper.
6Interestingly, this is not the objective of Basel II. According to the Basel Committee
(2001), the goal of Basel II is ‘neither to produce a net increase nor a net reduction — on
average — in minimum regulatory capital’.
10smaller during a recession. As a result, lower risk-based capital requirements
during a recession than during normal times suﬃce to implement the ﬁrst-best
allocation. Secondly, optimal risk-based capital requirements should also
decline in response to a potential increase in the banks’ cost of equity capital
in a recession (see also Kashyap and Stein, 2004). Together these results are
consistent with the view that the overall level of risk-based capital requirements
should vary in accordance with the business cycle, being relatively higher in
booms and lower in downturns. This view has been expresssed in recent
studies and policy discussions (see eg Goodhart, 2008, Gordy and Howells,
2006, Kashyap and Stein, 2004, Repullo and Suarez, 2008, and Risk, 2007).
The favorable allocational eﬀects of risk-based capital requirements have
implications for the procyclicality of risk-based capital requirements in
comparison with ﬂat-rate requirements. We illustrate these eﬀects by
simulating the economy over a business cycle which we deﬁne as a two-period
recession before turning to normal. We investigate procyclicality of ﬂat-rate
capital requirements and Basel II type capital requirements in terms of output.
Ouput is measured as labor income plus payoﬀs from successful projects minus
the banks’ opportunity cost. We assume that in normal times the average
Basel II capital requirement is the same (eight percent) as in the ﬂat-rate
regime. Finally, we compare the two ‘real-world’ capital regimes, Basel I and
Basel II, with the optimal risk-based capital requirements which are adjusted
downwards in recessions.
The simulation results verify our conjecture that because risk-based capital
requirements allocate less resources to high-risk projects, there are fewer
unsuccessful projects when a recession hits than under the ﬂat-rate regime.
This eﬀect contributes to a smaller output decline under risk-based capital
requirements in the recession. As the recession continues we ﬁnd that output
still falls less under risk-based capital requirements than under the ﬂat-rate
regime. This is because two favorable allocational eﬀects dominate the
traditional procyclical eﬀect that the number of projects that get ﬁnanced in a
recesssion declines more under risk-based capital requirements as a result of an
increase in project failure probabilities which results in an increase in capital
requirements. Overall, the Basel II regime appears slightly less procyclical than
Basel I, both in terms of cumulative output and output variation. However, in
our simulations, the optimal risk-based capital requirements which are adjusted
downwards in recessions are clearly the least procyclical of all the capital
requirement regimes considered.
S of a r ,t h e r eh a v en o tb e e nm a n yp a p e r sw h i c hf o c u so nt h ep o r t f o l i o
eﬀects of risk-based capital requirements. The paper closest related to ours is
the one by Boissay and Sorenssen (2009). Their main result is similar to ours
in that a favorable allocational eﬀect may attenuate procyclicality of bank
lending and, ultimately, its eﬀect on economic activity. They also build on
the basic model of DeMeza and Webb (1987). However, unlike us, they do not
consider capital requirements but banks’ own capital management rules; either
time-invariant or risk-sensitive. This allows them to use data on US banks
which have arguably followed various capital management rules, in order to
11test their model.7 A relatively early paper by Rochet (1992), motivated by the
changeover to Basel I, also found in a diﬀerent set up that risk-based capital
requirements can be eﬀective in implementing banks’ eﬃcient asset allocation.
Repullo and Suarez (2004) investigate loan pricing implications of Basel II
capital requirements. They consider both the ‘standardized’ approach based
on external ratings as well as the more risk-sensitive internal-ratings-based
(IRB) approach.8 In their model, banks can diﬀerentiate by choosing either
the standardized approach or the IRB approach. Repullo and Suarez (2004)
conclude that low risk borrowers achie v er e d u c t i o n si nl o a nr a t e sa st h e yd o
business with banks using the IRB approach. However, the prospects of
high-risk borrowers may not be weakened as they may borrow from banks
adopting the standardized approach. The diﬀerence between our paper and
Repullo and Suarez (2004) is that while they focus on the division of high-
a n dl o w - r i s kb o r r o w e r sb e t w e e nd i ﬀerent kind of banks using diﬀerent options
of Basel II, we focus on the allocation of high- and low-risk projects among
identical banks which all use the IRB approach. As in many countries a few
large and sophisticated banks dominate the market share and are likely users
of the IRB approach, we believe our focus is also relevant. Other related
studies focus on procyclicality (eg Gordy and Howells, 2006, and Kashyap
and Stein, 2004), the justiﬁcations of ‘excess’ capital buﬀers (Allen, Carletti
and Marquez, 2005), or empirical evidence of the cyclical ﬂuctuations of these
buﬀers (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2003, Jokipii and Milne, 2007). It has
also been argued that banks can hold extra buﬀers of capital in excess of the
minimum capital requirement and thereby alleviate procyclical eﬀects. Repullo
and Suarez (2008) show in a dynamic model that banks under Basel II may,
indeed, raise their capital buﬀers in booms but that that alone may not suﬃce
to avoid a credit crunch if a recession hits. In Heid’s (2007) model endogenous
buﬀers also have a mitigating role. Further related studies are Zicchino (2006)
and Zhu (2007). Studies have have investigated how Basel II type of regulation
could be improved to reduce the procyclical eﬀects. Kashyap and Stein (2004),
Gordy and Howells (2006) and Repullo and Suarez (2008) suggest and consider
7More precisely, Boissay and Sørensen (2009) consider a model in which all investment
projects are similar but the capital requirements of the entrepreneurs can nevertheless diﬀer,
because some banks use loan rating and others do not. In the model the more competent
entrepreneurs choose a bank which uses a costly rating technology and the less competent
entrepreneurs opt for unrated loans. The authors point out an interesting eﬀect, to which we
shall refer as the Boissay -Sørensen eﬀect, which reduces the procyclicality of rating-based
capital requirements: if the rated loans become less attractive during recessions, the quality
of the entrepreneurs who opt for unrated loans improves, and this reduces the interest rates
for unrated loans (ibid., p. 8). It turns out that the Boissay — Sørensen eﬀect has an analogy
also in the current model.
Since the investment projects do not inherently diﬀer from one another in the Boissay
-Sørensen model, all entrepreneurs in their model could be induced to make the socially
optimal choices with a Basel I type decision rule if the proﬁtability of their projects did not
change as a function of time. In this case a Basel II type requirement would always yield
a lower welfare level than the optimal Basel I type requirement, since the use of a Basel II
type requirement causes an extra cost of screening.
8In Basel II banks have the option to use either the simpler and less risk-sensitive
standardized approach or the more sophisticated and risk-sensitive IRB approach, subject
to supervisory approval. In practice it is expected that large and sophisticated banks opt
for the latter. In the US, the largest banks will only have the choice of the IRB approach.
12time-varying capital requirements as a cure. Repullo et al (2009) empirically
compare the various methods to implement these. Pennacchi (2005) argues
that implications for deposit insurance losses should also be taken into account
and suggests integration of risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based capital
requirements to reduce the procyclical impact. Lastly, we refer to the paper by
Repullo (2004) where the role of capital requirements in preventing ‘gambling’
in bank lending is stressed in a setting with bank market power. He ﬁnds
that both the ﬂat-rate and the risk-based capital regime can be successful in
this objective, albeit under the risk-based system the prevention of gambling is
implemented with lower overall level of regulatory capital. Our results suggest,
however, that ﬂat-rate capital requirements may actually increase ‘gambling’
(in the sense of overinvestment in the riskiest projects by the entrepreneurs)
whereas moving from ﬂat-rate capital requirements to the risk-based system
may signiﬁcantly reduce ’gambling’ as overinvestment in the riskiest projects
is reduced.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and
section 3 introduces banks to it. Secions 4 and 5 analyze the eﬀects of ﬂat-rate
and risk-based capital requirements on the model equilibrium, respectively.
Section 6 presents our simulation results, and section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a discrete time model with periods t =0 ,1,2,... in which the state
of the economy is in each period either N (normal) or R (recession). During
each period t, the probability that the economy is during the next period t+1
in the state σ ´(where σ ´∈ {N,R})i sd e t e r m i n e db yi t ss t a t eσ (σ ∈ {N,R})i n
the current period. This probability will below be denoted by γσσ ´,a n di tw i l l
be assumed that γNN >γ RN and γRR >γ NR so that, the piece of information
that the economy is in a state σ in a given period increases the probability
that the economy is in the same state also in the following period.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, indexed by θ. The distribution of
the parameter θ is given by a density function g(θ) which is non-zero only on
[0,1]. During each period t,t h ee n t r e p r e n e u rc a nb ei n v o l v e di nah i g h - r i s k( H)
or in a low-risk (L) project, or in a riskless outside option. High-risk projects
and low-risk projects both require investments, which must be ﬁnanced by a
bank. The entrepreneur must make a choice between these three options and
the bank makes its ﬁnancing decisions at the end of the previous period t−1,
before the state of the economy in period t is known.
The riskless outside option produces the wealth w>0.T h ev a l u ew is, for
simplicity, assumed to be independent of the type θ of the entrepreneur and
the state (N or R) of the economy. The high-risk and the low-risk projects
can either succeed or fail. The success probability of a project depends on 1)
the type η ∈ {H,L} of the project, 2) the current state σ ∈ {N,R} of the
economy, and 3) the type θ of the enterpreneneur. The functions e pση (θ) express
the success probability of a project as a function of θ for each combination of
the state of the economy (which is either N or R) in the period in which the
13project is realized, and the type η of the project (which is either H or L).
Intuitively, the θ value of an entrepreneur has been meant to represent her
competence, and in what follows it will be assumed that competence increases
the chances of success of both kinds of projects, but that it is more crucial
for the success of a high-risk project. Accordingly, we shall assume that both
when σ = N and when σ = R (ie both when the state of the economy is
normal and when it is recession)
e p´ σH (θ) > e p´ σL(θ) > 0 (2.1)
The intuitive idea that high-risk projects have smaller chances of success than
low-risk projects is captured by the assumption that9
0 < e pσH (θ) ≤ e pσL(θ) (2.2)
When an entrepreneur decides whether to start a project in the next period,
she does not know the state of the economy in the next period, but only its
current state. Accordingly, when the current state is normal (N), the success
probability of a new project of type η (where η = L or η = H)i sf o rt h e
entrepreneur θ
pNη(θ)=γNNe pNη(θ)+γNRe pRη (θ) (2.3)
and when the current state is recession (R), the success probability of a new
project is
pRη (θ)=γRRe pRη (θ)+γRNe pNη(θ) (2.4)
If the entrepreneur θ has at the end of period t−1 chosen a project of type η
(where η = L or η = H), the project produces vη (θ) in period t if it succeeds
and nothing if it fails. The competence of an entrepreneur θ increases also the
revenue vη (θ) from a project either kind, and by assumption, its eﬀects will
be stronger in the case of a high-risk project. We shall not formulate these
assumptions by stating simply that v ´ H (θ) >v ´ L(θ) > 0;r a t h e r ,w em a k et h e
slightly stronger assumption that both when σ = N and when σ = R
v ´ H (θ)pσH (θ) >v ´ L(θ)pσL(θ) > 0 (2.5)
Below we shall restrict attention to the economically plausible equilibria in
w h i c hi ne a c hp e r i o dt the least competent agents (agents in some interval




) choose the high-risk project, and there are also some agents in
between who choose the low-risk project (ie, θ < ¯ θ and all agents in the interval £
θ,¯ θ
¢
choose the low-risk project). Suppose now that the cut-oﬀ values which
correspond to the projects that have been chosen at the end of some period
9To be more precise, the assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) imply that high-risk projects have
a smaller chance of success than low-risk projects for all entrepreneurs, with the possible
exception of the entrepreneur θ =1 .
14t−1 are θ and ¯ θ. As it will be explained in a more detailed manner in the next
section, in the current model each successful entrepreneur θ with a project of
type η (η = L,H) will have to pay a sum ρη t ot h eb a n ki nr e t u r nf o rh e r
investment. Here ρη may depend on the cut-oﬀ values θ and ¯ θ, but not on





succeeds, her proﬁtw i l lb e
πL (θ)=vL (θ) − ρL (2.6)
and if the project of an entrepreneur θ ∈
£¯ θ,1
¤
succeeds, her proﬁt will be
πH (θ)=vH (θ) − ρH (2.7)
By assumption, the utility function which each entrepreneur is maximizing
while choosing between projects at the end of a period t − 1 is given by her
expected revenue in period t. Accordingly, the cut-oﬀ value θ is the value for
which the expected proﬁt from a low-risk project is identical with the revenue
from the outside option, and if in period t − 1 the state of the economy is σ
(σ ∈ {N,R}), it satisﬁes the condition
pσL(θ)(vL(θ) − ρL)=w (E1)
Similarly, the cut-oﬀ value ¯ θ is the value for which the expected proﬁtf r o ma








(vH (θ) − ρH) (E2)
According to the following lemma, the assumptions (2.1), (2.2),a n d(2.5)
suﬃce to guarantee that a combination of cut-oﬀ values θ and ¯ θ which satisﬁes
(E1) and (E2) corresponds to the kind of Nash equilibrium that we are
considering.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose that the probability functions pση (θ) and the revenue
functions vη (θ) satisfy the conditions (2.1) (2.2),a n d(2.5).I ft h ee q u i l i b r i u m
conditions (E1) and (E2) are valid and θ < ¯ θ,t h ec u t - o ﬀ values θ and ¯ θ
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium: in this case each entrepreneur θ<θ





will maximize her revenue by choosing a low-risk project, and each
entrepreneur θ>¯ θ will maximize her revenue by choosing a high-risk project.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
153B a n k s
By assumption, the implementation of a new project requires an external
ﬁnance of size I. This external funding can be obtained from competitive credit
markets in which banks deliver standard debt contracts. When a bank makes
its ﬁnancing decision, it can by assumpion observe the current state (normal
or recession) of the economy σ and also the type η (high-risk or low-risk) of













for the average success probability that the entrepreneurs in the interval [θ1,θ 2]
have in a project of type η in the state of the economy σ, the success probability
of a low-risk project is from the perspective of a bank given by





and the success probabilty of a high-risk project is from the perspective of a
bank given by




If a bank invested I units of ﬁnancial capital elsewhere in the ﬁnancial markets,
it could by assumption earn ¯ R,s ot h a t¯ R represents the opportunity cost of
ﬁnance. In addition, the regulator requires banks to raise costly equity capital.
We normalize the riskless interest rate to zero, so that ¯ R = I.
By assumption, banks are subject to a minimum capital requirement which
is proportional to the size of the investment I. We shall assume that the capital
requirement constitutes an additional ﬁn a n c i n gc o s tt ob a n k s .S t a r t i n gf r o m
Myers and Majluf (1984), there is a large literature justifying that for reasons
of asymmetric information external equity capital is the most costly form of
ﬁnance for ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions. Moreover, for banks in particular
equity can be costly because banks earn a part of their income from the interest
rate margin on their deposit base. eg Repullo and Suarez (2004) show how a
competitive bank would always choose the minimum amount of equity allowed
by the regulator (see also Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Finally, although it
may not generally be the case that regulatory minimum capital requirements
are a binding constraint on banks, evidence that banks hold more capital
than the regulatory minimum may merely indicate that in imperfect capital
markets banks need internal capital buﬀers to avoid the adverse consequences
from violating the minimum requirement (see eg Elizalde and Repullo, 2006,
and Gropp and Heider, 2007 and the references therein). Anecdotal evidence
of the motives of banks’ securitisations also suggests that banks do consider
regulatory capital requirements costly and may thus have alleviated these costs
partly via securitisations.
16We postulate that a bank can raise arbitrary amounts of deposits at the
rate 0, whereas an excess return of δ>0 is required on each unit of equity
capital. By assumption, there is a capital requirement according to which
for each unit of the loans that are given, a part b must be funded by equity,
and only a part 1 − b may be funded by deposits. Under ﬂat-rate capital
requirement, b has the same value for all projects, but under risk-based capital
requirements b = b(ˆ pση) is a function of the probability of success ˆ pση that the
bank perceives the project to have.
By assumption, the banks receive nothing in repayment from the
customers who go bankrupt, so that the repayment ρη from the non-bankrupt
entrepreneurs who have chosen a project of type η must satisfy the condition
b pσηρη =( 1− b) ¯ R + b(1 + δ) ¯ R (3.4)
Hence, the repayment ρη is given by
ρη =
(1 − b) ¯ R + b(1 + δ) ¯ R
b pση
=
(1 + bδ) ¯ R
b pση
(3.5)





























As our next step, we deﬁne the concept of a ﬁrst-best capital requirement,a n d
c o n s t r a s ti tw i t haﬂat-rate (Basel I type) capital requirement for which b is a
constant.
4 Flat-rate capital requirements and the ﬁrst-best
equilibrium
By deﬁnition, a capital requirement is ﬁrst-best if it yields an allocation of
resources which corresponds to the maximal expected welfare gain relative
to the information which is available when the projects are launched. More
precisely, the expected welfare gain which results from the agent θ getting
involved in a project of type η when the current state of the economy is σ is
by deﬁnition
pση (θ)vη (θ) − ¯ R
17and the welfare gain from the outside option is by deﬁnition w,s ot h a tt h e
socially optimal cut-oﬀ values θ
fb and ¯ θ




























If such cut-oﬀ values exist in the ﬁrst-best allocation, it is socially optimal for
the most competent entrepreneurs to choose the high-risk project, so that
w<p σL(θ)vL(θ) − ¯ R<p σH (θ)vH (θ) − ¯ R,w h e n θ>¯ θ
fb (4.3)
whereas for the least competent entrepreneurs it is socially optimal to choose
the outside option, so that
pσH (θ)vH (θ) − ¯ R<p σL(θ)vL (θ) − ¯ R<w ,w h e nθ<θ
fb. (4.4)
Under a ﬂat-rate capital requirement b is a constant regardless of the type of
the investment. Denoting the cut-oﬀ values which correspond to a ﬂat-rate
capital requirement by θ
FR and ¯ θ
FR, the equilibrium condition (E2’ ) is seen
































⎠(1 + bδ) ¯ R
(4.5)
Proposition 4.1 Under a ﬂat-rate capital requirement, there is
overinvestment in high-risk projects as entrepreneurs with ineﬃciently





Proof:W h e nθ = θ
FR and ¯ θ = ¯ θ















e pσL < 0.



















FR lies in the region in which it would be socially optimal to choose
the low-risk project, and ¯ θ
FR < ¯ θ
fb.¥
18The equation (4.5) shows that the overinvestment problem would exist also
without any extra capital requirement, ie, in the laissez-faire situation in
which b =0 . This is the conventional DeMeza-Webb (1987) overinvestment
result, and it stems from the fact that the more competent entrepreneurs
investing in high-risk projects cross-subsidize the less competent ones who
invest in similar projects, since the interest rates reﬂect average success rates.
The overinvestment mechanism is based on positive levels of the altervative
cost ¯ R, which causes a limited liability eﬀect on the entrepreneurs and spurs
risk-taking. Indeed, note from equation (4.5) that if ¯ R was zero, the ﬁrst-best
equilibrium would obtain.
An increase in a ﬂat-rate capital requirement b has a two-fold eﬀect on the
equilibrium cut-oﬀ values ¯ θ
FR. Firstly, it has the direct eﬀect of decreasing the







e pσL < 0
so that the direct eﬀect tends to decrease the left-hand side of (4.5). This eﬀect
corresponds to a decrease in ¯ θ
FR, and it makes a high-risk project seem more
attractive.
On the other hand, an increase of b tends to increase also θ
FR which shows
up as an increase of b pσL and of the left-hand side of (E20). Intuitively, this
means that as the lowest-quality entrepreneurs turn to the outside option, the
quality of the remaining entrepreneurs rises and this lowers the interest rates for
the low-risk projects. In this way, the low-risk projects become more attractive
for the more competent entrepreneurs, which tends to increase ¯ θ
FR.T h i s
interconnection between θ
FB and ¯ θ
FR constitutes an analogy of the Boissay —
Sørensen eﬀect in the current model (see footnote 7 above).
There seem to be no general and elegant theorems concerning the relative
magnitudes of these two eﬀects. In the simulations whose results we report in
Section 6.2 the two eﬀects cancel each other out almost exactly, but in other
simulations it has turned out that an increase in b causes a slight increase in
the cut-oﬀ value ¯ θ
FR.
The equilibrium condition (E10), which characterizes the lower cut-oﬀ
























Remark 4.2 The cut-oﬀ value θ
FR, which determines the choice between





pσL(θfb) − 1) ≡ bfb
19If b<b fb, entrepreneurs with ineﬃciently low success rates choose to invest
in low-risk projects. On the other hand, if b>b fb, too many entrepreneurs
opt to choose the ﬁxed payoﬀ. Since the extra capital requirement does not
hit the payoﬀ from the ﬁxed outside option, b can be used to limit market
participation. At the margin in which the entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between
taking up a low-risk investment and opting for the safe payoﬀ the capital
requirement reduces the incentive to invest and thus alleviates the excess
market entry due to the cross-subsidization eﬀect. The value bfb is exactly
the level of regulatory capital that implements the ﬁrst-best division.
5 Risk-based capital requirements




,s ot h a tt h ev a l u eo f
the capital requirement is diﬀerent for the high-risk (η = H)a n dt h el o w - r i s k
(η = L) investments. Introducing the notations bH = b(b pσH) and bL = b(b pσL)
for the two capital requirements which are in use simulaneously, the equilibrium































δ ¯ R(bH − bL)
Similarly, the condition (E10) can be put into the form







b pσL − pσL(θ)
b pσL
¯ R (5.2)
Remark 5.1 Risk-based capital requirement yields the eﬃcient cut-oﬀs θ =
θ
fb





















Proof: Follows directly from (4.1),(4.2), (5.1)and (5.2).¥
This remark states that, contrary to the ﬂat-rate regime, there exists a
risk-based capital requirement schedule which implements both the ﬁrst-best
loan composition and the ﬁrst-best lending volume. This is because the
risk-based system oﬀers as many independent instruments which aﬀect
allocational eﬃciency as there are diﬀerent loan categories. The diﬀerentiation
of capital requirements for high-risk and low-risk projects makes it possible
to increase the cost of the high-risk project relative to the low-risk project
20in order to discourage interim type entrepreneurs from taking the high-risk
project. This is not the case under a ﬁxed capital requirement, which provides
only a single instrument, so that eﬃciency can be obtained only at the margin
where entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between investment and the safe outside
option.
Importantly, our model also suggests two reasons for why the optimal
risk-based capital requirements might be smaller during an economic
downturn. One of these is obvious from Remark 2 which shows that the
optimal capital requirements are declining functions of the cost of capital,
δ. If the cost of capital rises in an economic downturn, which may well be
the case, risk-based capital requirements should optimally be set lower. This
channel through which the business cycle may have an impact on optimal
capital requirements has been analyzed also in Kashyap and Stein (2004).
In order to see the other reason why the optimal risk-based capital
requirements might be lower in recessions, it is helpful to give yet another
reformulation for the equilibrium conditions (E1) and (E2). The proﬁtt h a tt h e
cut-oﬀ entrepreneur θ earns from a low-risk project can be expressed explicitly













Here the term which contains bL has a negative sign. This term can be
interpreted as an extra cost which is imposed by the social planner on the
entrepreneur by means of the capital requirement, and which is analogous with
a tax that a social planner might introduce for correcting a market failure. In
the ﬁrst-best case in which bL = b∗
















L = w (5.4)





is, intuitively, the proﬁt of the entrepreneur in the
absence of capital requirements, and the formula states that the ‘extra cost’
has the value which restores the proﬁt of the entrepreneur θ = θ
fbto the level






proﬁt in the absence of capital requirements — which appears in (5.4) would
decrease in a recession, and if this is the case, (5.4) suggests that also the
‘extra cost’ b∗
L imposed by the social planner would have to decrease in order
to restore ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
Similarly, the proﬁt of the cut-oﬀ entrepreneur θ from a high-risk project






















and when the capital requirements have their ﬁrst-best values, the equilibrium



























from a high-risk project can be expected
to decrease in a recession more than the proﬁt from a low-risk project, (5.6)
suggests that also the optimal capital requirement b∗
H would decrease. The











which causes the market failure decreases, also the ‘extra cost’
which is needed for correcting the market failure must decrease. It should
be noted that this intuitively plausible argument is not valid for all possible
probability functions pση and revenue functions vη (because, among other
reasons, also the optimal values θ = θ
fb and θ = θ
fb
are shifted by the
emergence of a recession), but it turns out to be valid for the plausibly chosen
functions that we use in the simulations.
6 Simulation results
6.1 Specifying the success probabilities and parameter values
In the simulations whose results are discussed below it has been postulated that
the density of the θ values among the entrepreneurs is given by the constant
function g(θ)=1 . The success probabilities of both low-risk and high-risk
projects have been speciﬁed as linear functions of θ,s ot h a te pσL ´(θ) and e pσH´(θ)
a r ec o n s t a n t s .W eh a v em a d et h ei d e a l i z i n ga s s u m p t i o n st h a tw h e nt h es t a t e
of the economy is normal, the most competent entrepreneur (the one for whom
θ =1 ) will always succeed in the project that she chooses. Accordingly, it is
postulated that in normal times, the success probabilities of both high-risk
(η = H)a n dl o w - r i s k( η = L) projects have the simple linear speciﬁcations
e pNη(θ)=1− Bη (1 − θ) (6.1)
where BL and BH are constants. By assumption, the success probability of
a low-risk project is reduced by a factor e ξ and the success probability of a
high-risk project is lowered by a factor e ζ in a recession, so that
e pRL (θ)=e ξe pNL(θ) (6.2)
and
e pRH (θ)=e ζe pNH(θ) (6.3)
In the simulations the values of BL,B H, e ζ, and e ξ have been chosen so that
BLe ξ<B He ζ and e ζ<e ξ<1, so that the assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) are valid
for the chosen functions e pση. Intuitively, the assumption e ζ<e ξ<1 means that
22the success probabilities of the high-risk projects decline in recessions more
than the success probabilities of the low-risk projects.10
The maximum value of the revenue from a project of type η is denoted by
V1,η,s ot h a tf o rb o t hη = L,H, vη (1) = V1,η. Also the functions vη (θ) will be
given a linear speciﬁcation, so that
vη (θ)=V1,η − Cη (1 − θ) (6.4)
where CH and CL will be chosen so that CH/CL is suﬃciently large to make
the assumption (2.5)valid for the entrepreneurs who choose high-risk projects.
We normalize the value of the outside option w to 1.F o l l o w i n g
Repullo-Suarez (2008, p. 20), the excess return of δ which is required for equity
capital has been set to δ =0 .04, and the transition probabilities between the








We have also postulated that a recession decreases the chances of success of a
high-risk project by 5% and those of a low-risk project by 1%, so that e ξ =0 .99
and e ζ =0 .95.
The rest of the parameters of the model are not easily observable. We
have calibrated them using estimates for a number of more directly observable
features of the economy during a normal state. The features which we have
used for calibration include 1) the ratio between the number nH of high-risk
projects and the number nL of low projects nH/nL, 2) actual success rates
(ie rates of not going bankrupt) of both low-risk (L) and high-risk (H) ﬁrms,
e pNL,AV and e pNH,AV,3 )t h ea v e r a g ep r o ﬁts per employee πNL,av and πNH,av of
both low-risk and high-risk non-bankrupt ﬁrms, and 4) the average turn-over
per employee vNL,av of non-bankrupt low-risk ﬁrms.
Table 1 lists the values of these quantities, together with the parameters
whose values have already been ﬁx e da b o v e . S i n c ei nt h ei n t e n d e da p p l i c a t i o n
of the model there is a relatively large share of potential enterpreneurs who
might reasonably choose a low-risk project, whereas an essentially smaller
share of the potential enterpreneurs has a realistic chance of succeeding in a
h i g h - r i s kp r oj e c t ,w eh a v ep o s t u l a t e dt h a tnH/nL =1 /3.W eh a v eu s e dv a r i o u s
sources of information as well as judgement in order to obtain reasonable values
for the rest of the quantities which are listed in Table 1. For instance, in
calibrating the average normal time proﬁts of the diﬀerent project types, we
have used tax authorities’ recent information from Finland that on the average
10This assumption appears quite natural and can be given a few interpretations. We
may think of the high-risk projects as investments into new products to be introduced
to the market. Such investments often take place in economic upturns but might easily
turn unproﬁtable if the aggregate demand turns down. Low-risk projects in turn could
represent investments in already existing products which are less sensitive to overall demand
ﬂuctuations. More generally, almost by deﬁnition the ‘beta’ of a high-risk project is high,
indicating high exposure to market wide factors, often strongly correlated with the business
cycle.
23entrepreneurial income is approximately one third higher than the average
salary income.
The task of calibrating the remaing parameter values to the values which
appear in Table 1 is made more diﬃc u l tb yt h ef a c tt h a tt h ef o r m u l a sw h i c h
connect them contain also the capital requirements whose eﬀects we wish to
compare.. Since we just wish to ﬁnd parameter values which roughly ﬁtt h e
empirical evidence, we deduce the missing values by assuming that the values in
Table 1 apply to a laissez-faire case in which there are no capital requirements
(ie, b =0for both low-risk and high-risk projects), and the state of the economy
is normal in both the current period t and the previous period t − 1.
In the simulations BL and BH have been given values which are suﬃciently
large to guarantee that the entrepreneur θ =0always chooses the outside
option, independently of the state of the economy. When this is the case, the
value of BL c a nb ev i e w e da sﬁxing the limit between the economic agents
who are viewed as potential entrepreneurs (despite of the fact that they never
choose to become actual entrepreneurs, due to their low chances of success),
and individuals who are not included in the model, since they are not viewed
as entrepreneurs even potentially. This limit may be chosen by convention;
below we have chosen BL =0 .1,i m p l y i n gt h a te pNL(θ)=0 .9 for the least
competent individual θ =0who still qualiﬁes as a potential entrepreneur.
It turn out that the six parameter values which are still missing after
this conventional deﬁnition (ie ¯ R, BH, CL, CH, V1,L,a n dV1,H) are uniquely
determined by the six values which appear in Table 1 and which are not
parameters of the model (ie nH/nL, e pNH,AV, e pNH,AV, πNL,av, πNH,av,a n d
vNL,av). These values have been listed in Table 2. The procedure for calculating
these values has been outlined in Appendix 2.
The simulations contrast the laissez-faire situation with three other
capital requirement regimes. We have considered a Basel I type ﬂat-rate
capital requirement b =0 .08, a counterpart of the real-world Basel II type
requirement, and the ‘ﬁrst-best capital requirement’ which has been described
in Remark 2. The counterpart of the real world Basel II requirement has been
taken to be a requirement which is determined in accordance with the Basel II



















and p =1− b pση is the perceived probability of default of a project of type
η, when the state of the economy is σ. For simplicity, the loss given default
parameter λ has been calibrated so that in a persisting normal state the average
capital requirement is identical with the Basel I capital requirement b =0 .08.
This follows a stated goal of the Basel Committee, according to which the
average capital requirement in the banking sector should not change as a result
of the changeover from Basel I to Basel II, and which has been implemented
by a separate calibration factor in the Basel II framework.
246.2 Results
We simulated the model for eight periods and assumed that there is a
two-period recession which starts in the third period of the simulation. After
that the economy returns to the normal macro state. Figure 1 depicts the
evolution of the capital requirements we have used in each of the four regimes.
Note that the capital requirement of the high-risk project increases more as a
result of the recession than the capital requirement of the low-risk project.11
This follows directly from our assumption that the success probabilities of
the high-risk projects decline more in recessions than the success probabilities
of the low-risk projects. It should also be noted that capital requirements
rise as a result of the recession ﬁrst in the second recession period (ie in
period 4) because capital requirements for projects that are implemented
in any given period are determined already in the previous period and are
hence conditional on the then prevailing macro state. The most dramatic
diﬀerence, however, is in the optimal risk-based capital requirements. First
of all, the central result discussed in section 5 that the optimal risk-based
capital requirements are lower in recessions is conﬁrmed by these numerical
results. Second, the level of capital requirement for both the low-risk and the
high-risk project is higher than any other capital requirement and, moreover,
the optimal capital requirement of the high-risk project is approximately 76 per
cent in normal times (declining to 70 per cent in the recession). Although this
seems unrealistic, we have to remember that in our model framework capital
requirements have only the role of guiding resource allocation via banks’ loan
pricing. This allocational eﬀect ultimately stems from the premium paid on
equity capital which is 4 per cent in our calibration. If the diﬀerence in capital
requirements between low-risk and high-risk project is about 60 percentage
points, this means that the high-risk project should have 2.4 percentage points
(0.6 times 4 per cent) higher loan price margin, which is quite plausible.
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate how the threshold entrepreneur types vary over
the business cycle in the diﬀerent capital requirement regimes. These results
are well in line with our theoretical predictions in sections 2—5. Consider
ﬁgure 2a which depicts the lower threshold type which indicates the sum of
entrepreneurs in both low-risk and high-risk projects. Compared to the optimal
requirement, the zero capital requirement laissez-faire regime allocates most
excess resources to entrepreneurial activity. Basel I and Basel II are very
close to one another with Basel II allocating slightly more resourcs to total
investment projects. Figure 2b gives the threshold entrepreneur of the high-risk
project. The laissez-faire and Basel I regimes are now indistinguishable while
Basel II allocates slighty less resources to high-risk projects (its high-risk
threshold type is higher). Yet they all clearly allocate excessive resources
to high-risk projects compared to the optimal allocation given by the optimal
capital requirement regime.
In table 3 and ﬁgure 3 we provide evidence of the procyclicality of the
various capital requirement regimes. For each simulation period from 1 to 8
11The Basel II capital requirement for the low-risk project increases from approximately 7
to 8 per cent from normal to a recesssion period and the capital requirement of the high-risk
project increases correspondingly from about 10.5 per cent to 13 per cent.
25we report the output in each regime. Output would equal one hundred (100) if
all agents chose the outside option. As we can thus see, normal times’ output
is about 6 per cent higher in each regime, as a result of entrepreneurial activity,
than the benchmark output of 100. Output drops by a bit less than two per
cent between period 2 and 3 when the economy falls into recession. This
suggests that our model calibration is able to produce a plausible magnitude
of business cycle ﬂuctuation.
We summarize the procyclicality of the various capital requirement regimes
over the simulation sample with two measures; cumulative output over the
eight periods and the standard deviation of output. Both measures result in
the same ranking that the laissez-faire regime is the most procyclical, followed
by Basel I. Basel II is slightly less procyclical than Basel I while the optimal
risk-based capital requirements are the least procyclical.
Quantitative diﬀerences between the regimes are very small. The
percentual diﬀerence between Basel I and Basel II in the drop of output in the
ﬁrst recession period is negligible. The diﬀerence between Basel II and optimal
capital requirements is 0.12 percentage points. In any case, we believe that it
is more essential to focus on the qualitative diﬀerences between the regimes.
After all, the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 has shown as some authors
have suggested (see eg Acharya and Schnabl, 2009) that distorted investment
incentives related to capital requirements can under some circumstances lead
to very serious misallocations. Then again, the result that the quantitative
diﬀerences between diﬀerent capital regimes are only very small could also
indicate that in the course of normal business cycle ﬂuctuations, the procyclical
eﬀects of capital requirements should not be exaggerated.
Let us take a closer look at Basel I and Basel II regimes in table 3 and
ﬁgure 3. The results verify our expectation that because risk-based capital
requirements allocate less resources to high-risk projects (cf. ﬁgure 2), there
are fewer unsuccessful projects and hence higher output when a recession hits
than under the ﬂat-rate regime. As the recession continues for the second
period (period 4), output is still higher under Basel II than under Basel I.
This is a result of three diﬀerent eﬀects. First, consistent with the traditional
procyclical eﬀect the number of projects that get ﬁnanced in a recesssion
declines more under risk-based capital requirements because project failure
probabilities and thus capital requirements increase. However, this eﬀect is
dominated by two opposing eﬀects. The ﬁrst of them is the favorable allocation
eﬀect that the share of high-risk projects continues to be smaller in each period
under risk-based capital requirements. The second eﬀect is the more subtle
Boissay-Sørensen (2009) eﬀect (cf. footnote 7 above). Because in a recession
the success probabilities of high-risk projects decline relatively more than those
of low-risk projects, the number of high-risk projects is also reduced relatively
more under risk-based capital requirements. As a result, more higher-type
entrepreneurs choose the low-risk project which improves the average success
rate of the low-risk projects. This lowers the ﬁnancing cost of the low-risk
project and encourages also lower-type entrepreneurs to opt for the low-risk
project instead of taking the outside option. Note that in the ﬁfth period, the
ﬁrst normal period after recession, the output ranking of all regimes is actually
reversed for that one period only. The reason for this is that returning to
26normal is a positive ‘surprise’ to the economy in the sense that investment
decisions in the previous periods were still done in an on-going recession.
So in the ﬁrst period after the recesssion, those capital requirement regimes
that allocated resources most excessively, particularly to high-risk investment
projects, beneﬁt the most of the higher success rates which materialized in the
ﬁfth period.
Taken together, our results may be somewhat surprising in that, in contrast
with prior views, capital requirements tend to reduce procyclicality of the
economy. This is the case already when moving from no capital requirements
to the ﬂat-rate regime. Moreover, the more risk-sensitive Basel II is less
procyclical than the ﬂat-rate Basel I. These outcomes result from the better
allocational properties of ﬂat-rate capital requirements vis-á-vis no capital
requirements as well as the better allocational properties of risk-based capital
requirements vis-á-vis ﬂat-rate requirements. What is in line also with prior
views is that by adjusting risk-based capital requirements downwards in
recessions, as opposed to the current Basel II in which capital requirements
increase in recessions, procyclicality is further dampened. However, overall
optimal capital requirements are much higher than the Basel II requirements.
Quantitatively, such adjustments appear to be the most important factors
that curb procyclicality. Overall, our results can be understood as follows. An
economy which is plagued by informational asymmetries in the credit market
may be inherently procyclical in comparison to the ﬁrst-best economy. Capital
requirements can be used to take the economy closer to the ﬁrst-best allocation
and, indeed, risk-based capital requirements can be optimally chosen so as to
implement the ﬁrst-best.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have investigated the eﬀect of risk-based capital adequacy
regulation, such as Basel II, on the eﬃciency of resource allocation in credit
markets. Our model has a simple dynamic setting with two exogenously
determined Markov macro states so that we are also able to analyze the
eﬀects on procyclicality of the risk-based capital requirements vis-á-vis ﬂat-rate
capital requirements. Allocational eﬃciency is driven by entrepreneurs’
self-selection among investments of diﬀerent risk categories. The conventional
result (eg De Meza and Webb, 1987) in this kind of setting is that there
is too much risk-taking because high-type borrowers cross-subsidize low-type
borrowers through the price system that is based on average success rates. The
risk-based capital requirements, in turn, alleviate the cross-subsidization eﬀect,
improving allocational eﬃciency in the credit market. The ability of Basel II
type of capital requirements to improve allocational eﬃciency, formalized in
this paper, is important in the light of the view that excessive risks may tend
to build up during good times. Moreover, lower capital requirement against
less risky loans increases entrepreneurs’ general participation in the credit
market, so that the overall lending volume is higher under the risk-based capital
requirements than under the ﬂat-rate regime. It is also shown that there exists
27a risk-based capital requirement schedule that implements both the ﬁrst-best
loan composition and the ﬁrst-best lending volume. Such optimal risk-based
capital requirements should be set lower in recesssions than in normal times.
It is worth emphasizing that optimal capital requirements that are adjusted
downwards in recessions are obtained endogenously in our model framework
(see also Kashyap and Stein, 2004). In much of the literature the implications
of recession-adjusted capital requirements, which is also an important policy
question, have been studied by exogenously adding the adjustment rule to
capital requirements.
Simulations with the calibrated model support the view that allocational
eﬀects of diﬀerent capital requirement regimes should be taken into account
when comparing their procyclical properties. In actuality, Basel II type
capital requirements appear slightly less procyclical than the ﬂat-rate Basel
I requirements. Moreover, we ﬁnd strong indications that optimally chosen
risk-based capital requirements which, overall, are much higher but which
are set relatively lower in recessions, are less procyclical both in terms of
cumulative output and output variation over the business cycle. These results
support the view that the current Basel II framework could be further improved
by setting capital requirements higher and making them a function of the state
of the business cycle. This should be done by taking into account how the state
of the business cycle has an eﬀect on the proﬁtability of investment projects.
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31Appendix 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
If the entrepreneur θ chooses a project of type η in a period in which the
state of the economy is σ, the expected revenue from it is
E (πη (θ)) = pση (θ)
¡
vη (θ) − ρη
¢
The deﬁnitions (2.3),a n d(2.4) immediately imply that the conditions (2.1)
and (2.2) are valid also for the probabilities pση.
Let θmin,η be the smallest value of θ in [0,1] for which the revenue from
a successful project of type η, vη (θ) − ρη, is non-negative. Assume ﬁrst that
θ ≥ θmin,L. Clearly, the conditions (2.1) and (2.5) imply that
dE (πL(θ))
dθ
= p ´ σL(θ)(vL(θ) − ρL)+pσL(θ)v ´ L(θ) > 0 (7.1)
Since θ is the value of θ for which E (πη (θ)) = w,
a low-risk project is preferable to the outside option for the agent θ if θ>θ ,
and the converse is true when θ<θ .




































(vH (θ) − ρH)+
pσH(θ)



























/pσL(θ). Multiplying each of these results by
pσL(θ), it follows that
when θ>¯ θ, a high-risk project is preferable to a low-risk project for the
entrepreneur θ, whereas when θ<¯ θ either a low-risk project or the outside
option is prefereable to a high-risk project.
The lemma follows by combining the two italicized conclusions.¤
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T h ep r o c e d u r ef o rﬁxing the parameters of the model.
In what follows we shall ouline the procedure with which one arrives from
the observable values in Table 1 to the parameters in Table 2.
First, it is observed that the values e pNη,AV which describe the actual success










γNN + γNRe ζ
´
e pNH,AV
By taking averages in (2.6) and using (3.5), it follows that
πNL,av = vNL,av −
¯ R
e pNL
after which the value of ¯ R c a nb es o l v e da s
¯ R = b pNL(vNL,av − πNL,av)
In a next step, it is observed that the values θ and ¯ θ a r ec o n n e c t e db yt h et w o
linear equations








¡¯ θ − θ
¢
=1− ¯ θ
from which one may solve θ and ¯ θ.W h e n b o t h ¯ θ and ¯ R are known, the








can be solved relative to vL (θ).
In what follows the value of θ for which vη (θ)=vNη,av (where η = L,H)


















CL U ¯ θ
θ h pNL(θ)dθ
R ¯ θ
θ e pNL(θ)(θ − θ)dθ
implying that b θL is given by




θ e pNL(θ)(θ − θ)dθ







b θL − θ
´
and the value of CL is seen to equal
CL = (vNL,av−vL(θ))
e θL−θ
When both vL (θ) and CL have become known, also the value V1,L is determined
by (6.4) , since it implies that
V1,L = vL (θ)+Cη (1 − θ)
Turning to the parameters which characterize the high-risk projects, it is
observed that since the probability function e pNH has the linear speciﬁcation
(6.1),










When BH and accordingly, the functions e pNH and pNH have become known,





















c a nb es o l v e dw i t hr e s p e c tt ovH
¡¯ θ
¢
. On the other hand, the value of vNH,av
can be solved by taking averages in (2.7) and using (3.5),w h i c hy i e l d s
vNH,av = πNH,av +
¯ R
e pNH




= vNH,av can be calculated analogously
with the value of b θL,a n di t sv a l u et u r n so u tt ob e
b θH = ¯ θ + 1 U 1
¯ θ h pNH(θ)dθ
R 1
¯ θ e pNH(θ)
¡
θ − ¯ θ
¢
dθ


















, vNH,av,a n db θH are known, one can solve this equation with










1 − ¯ θ
¢
.
In this way, we have ﬁxed all the parameters of the model.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.   The observable features of the economy which 
      have been used for calibrating the parameter 
     values 
 




  L H n / n AV , NL p ~
AV , NH p ~
av , NL π av , NH π   av , NL v   δ 
0.8 0.36  1  0.99  0.95  1/3  0.99  0.98  1.2  2  6  0.04 
 
 
Table 2.   The rest of the parameter values that have been 
      used in the simulations 
 
R  BL  BH  CL  CH  V1,L  V1,H 
4.7425 0.1  1  3.0223  27.5955  6.3019  7.4363 
 
 
Table 3.   Output over the eight simulation periods. 
      Recession in periods 3 and 4. Output would be 100 
      if all agents chose the outside option. 
 
period  laissez-faire  Basel I  Basel II  optimal 
1  106.4017 106.4061 106.4077 106.4099 
2  106.4017 106.4061 106.4077 106.4099 
3  104.3388 104.3699 104.3743 104.5000 
4  104.4930 104.5122 104.5196 104.5800 
5  106.4115 106.4036 106.4017 106.3515 
6  106.4017 106.4061 106.4077 106.4099 
7  106.4017 106.4061 106.4077 106.4099 
8  106.4017 106.4061 106.4077 106.4099 
Cumulative 
output 
847.2518 847.3162 847.3341 847.4810 
Standard 




Figure 1.  Capital requirements (%) over the eight (8) 





















Figure 2a.  Threshold type entrepreneurs for low-risk 
     projects,  θ, (vertical axis) in different capital 
      requirement regimes over the eight simulation 
      periods (horizontal axis). The size of the pool of 
     potential  entrepreneurs is normalized to one. 
     Hence  1–θ is the total share of entrepreneurs with 
      high-risk or low-risk projects. Correspondingly, 
     θ indicates the share of labor market participants. 
















Figure 2b.  Threshold type entrepreneurs for high-risk 
     projects,  θ, (vertical axis) in different capital 
      requirement regimes over the eight simulation 
      periods (horizontal axis). The size of the pool of 
     potential  entrepreneurs  is normalized to one. 1–θ is 
      the share of entrepreneurs with high-risk projects. 


















(* Laissez-faire threshold values virtually coincide with the threshold values of Basel I. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Output over the eight simulation periods. 
      Recession in periods 3 and 4. Output would be 
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